Metric Development for Continuous Process Improvement by Degenhardt, Mark A.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-11-2011
Metric Development for Continuous Process
Improvement
Mark A. Degenhardt
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Degenhardt, Mark A., "Metric Development for Continuous Process Improvement" (2011). Theses and Dissertations. 1491.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1491
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METRIC DEVELOPMENT FOR 
CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
 
THESIS 
 
Mark A. Degenhardt, Captain, USAF 
AFIT/OR-MS/ENS/11-04 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government. 
 
 
  
AFIT/OR-MS/ENS/11-04 
 
 
 
 
METRIC DEVELOPMENT FOR CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Engineering and Environmental Management 
 
 
 
 
Mark A. Degenhardt, BA 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
March 2011 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 

 iv 
AFIT/OR-MS/ENS/11-04 
Abstract 
 
 Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) is not currently being 
used as effectively as it could be across the Air Force.  Instead of trying to simply save 
money here or cut man-hours there, AFSO21 tools should be used to help the Air Force 
“fly, fight and win” better.   
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed a methodology to 
identify specific target areas where continuous process improvement, i.e., AFSO21, can 
be applied to improve the bottom line of an organization.  The first step of this process is 
to solicit the key performance indicators (KPIs) that best reflect the organization’s 
mission.  The second step is to use and/or develop metrics based on those KPIs to 
measure the organization’s mission performance today.  The third step is to capture the 
trends of those KPIs over time to see if the organization is getting better or worse.  The 
final step is to identify the largest performance capability gaps in order to determine 
where AFSO21 resources should be applied to get “the most bang for the buck”.   
The result of this process should give the decision maker the ability to improve 
the bottom line of an organization by improving its weakest areas.  Air Combat 
Command is used as a case study for the application of this methodology. 
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METRIC DEVELOPMENT FOR CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
I. Introduction 
Background 
The use of Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) within organizations has 
become very popular in recent years.  Since early pioneers invented machines that 
enabled and improved mass production, others have taken additional steps forward, such 
as creatively applying statistical methods to analyze processes and improve quality by 
reducing variation within processes.  Today, some companies focus their CPI efforts on 
maximizing the quality of their products and services in order to improve customer 
satisfaction, while others use CPI as a mechanism for driving down costs.  Still others 
aim to change the culture within their organization to one that rewards its members for 
sharing ideas that continually improve their internal business processes and policies.   
In general, the purpose of CPI is to reduce costs, eliminate waste, increase 
efficiency, improve product quality, and maximize value to the customer.  This is true for 
profit and non-profit organizations alike.  For the Air Force, the desired effects of its CPI 
initiative, Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21), are to increase 
productivity of its personnel, increase critical asset availability, improve response time, 
maintain safe and reliable operations, and improve energy efficiency.  Unfortunately, 
these effects have not yet been fully realized since the advent of AFSO21.   
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Problem Statement  
AFSO21 is not currently being used as effectively as it could be across the Air 
Force.  The Air Force website, Air Force Times, and other media sources tell about 
various success stories where processes are streamlined, hundreds of man-hours are cut, 
and thousands of American tax dollars are saved.  These are obviously very good things, 
but the reader needs to question the effect that these scattered (and somewhat random) 
improvements have on the core mission.  In other words, the question is: how can 
AFSO21 be used to get away from creating appealing headlines to truly making a 
difference for the Air Force?   
Research Objective 
The purpose of this research is to find a way to use CPI tools to go from simply 
saving money here or cutting man-hours there to solving the bigger issue of improving 
the Air Force’s bottom line.  For a business, the bottom line is profit.  Therefore, to 
improve their bottom line is to increase profit.  However, since the Air Force is a non-
profit government entity, it can be argued that its bottom line is mission performance.  In 
other words, the Air Force need to use CPI tools to “fly, fight and win” better.   
Methodology 
This research provides a methodology to identify specific target areas where 
continuous process improvement, i.e., AFSO21, should be applied to improve the bottom 
line of an organization.  The first step in this process is to engage the decision maker to 
solicit the key performance indicators (KPIs) that best reflect the organization’s mission.  
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The goal for this step is to make a list of the answers to the “why are we here” question.  
The second step is to use and/or develop appropriate metrics based on those KPIs to 
measure how well the organization is doing its mission today.  The third step is to capture 
the trends of those KPIs over time to see if the organization is getting better or worse.  
The fourth and final step is to identify the largest performance capability gaps in order to 
determine where AFSO21 resources should be applied to get “the most bang for the 
buck”.  The result of this process should give the decision maker a clear snapshot of 
his/her organization’s current ability to perform its mission.  This, in turn, gives him/her 
the ability to improve the bottom line by targeting the weakest areas.   
Scope 
The methodology presented in this paper is applicable to any organization, which, 
by definition, is any entity that pursues collective goals, controls its own performance, 
and has a boundary separating it from its environment.  This includes profit and non-
profit organizations.  The Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC) will be examined as 
a case study for a specific application of the proposed methodology.   
Paper Organization 
This research presents a framework for applying CPI in order to improve the 
bottom line of an organization.  In Chapter 2, the research begins by examining 
foundational concepts including various CPI methodologies, principles of metric 
development, basic tenets of regression analysis, and background information about 
ACC.  In Chapter 3, the previous concepts are combined to establish a methodology for 
effectively employing CPI in an organization.  Chapter 4 details the analysis performed 
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and results achieved through application of the methodology to ACC.  Finally, 
recommendations for further study and future implementation are provided in Chapter 5.   
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide a foundation for the discussion 
about metric development for Continuous Process Improvement (CPI).  It briefly 
introduces some common CPI methodologies, culminating with a description of 
AFSO21, which is the CPI methodology used by the Air Force.  It also describes the key 
tenets of metric development and provides a description of the Air Combat Command 
(ACC) organization which will be used as the case study for the methodology in this 
thesis.   
Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) 
CPI Defined 
Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) is problem solving.  It refers to the 
integrated system of improvement that organizations use to analyze and improve their 
internal processes on a recurring basis by focusing on doing the right things, right (Liker, 
2004).  This concept stems from the Japanese term kaizen, which is a philosophy that 
emphasizes continuous improvement throughout all aspects of life; kai means “change” 
and zen means “good”.  As a way of thinking, CPI is relevant to any process, regardless 
of complexity or relative importance (Womack, 2003).   
The Purpose of CPI 
The goal of CPI is inherent in its name; to continuously improve products and 
services. Knowledge about what the customer wants is essential to achieving this goal 
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because the customer determines what is of value (Womack, 2003).  In the private sector, 
the goal of CPI is typically to reduce costs related to internal processes and people in 
order to increase profits and provide higher quality products to customers.  In the 
military, the goal is to achieve lower cost, shorter lead times, and higher quality in order 
to deliver better products more quickly to the warfighter (AF Journal of Logistics, 2008).   
CPI Methodologies 
Some of the CPI programs that are being used throughout corporate America 
include Lean, Six Sigma, Quality, Business Process Reengineering (BPR), and Theory of 
Constraints (TOC).  Within the DoD, CPI programs have service-specific titles, such as 
the Navy's AIRSpeed, the Air Force's Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21), 
and the Army's Lean Six Sigma (LSS) program. 
Lean 
The fundamental premise of “lean” is the elimination of muda, or waste, in the 
workplace.  Waste can be defined as “any activity that consumes resources but creates no 
value” (Womack, 2003).  According to the best-selling book The Toyota Way, there are 
eight types of waste in the workplace: overproduction, waiting, unnecessary transport and 
conveyance, over processing (or incorrect processing), excess inventory, unnecessary 
movement, defects, and unused employee creativity (Liker, 2004).  The purpose of being 
lean is to be able to identify and remove these types of waste to “do more and more with 
less and less – less human effort, less equipment, less time, and less space – while 
coming closer and closer to providing customers with exactly what they want” (Womack, 
2003).  Lean production is based largely on the Toyota Production System, Toyota’s 
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unique approach to manufacturing that allows them to use “fewer man-hours, less 
inventory (to produce) the highest quality cars with the fewest defects of any competing 
manufacturer” (Liker, 2004).  Toyota pioneered this system after World War II during a 
time when American companies Ford and GM were using mass production and large 
equipment to produce as many parts as possible as cheaply as possible.  Toyota, however, 
had a much smaller customer base, and had to produce a variety of vehicles in small 
quantities using the same assembly line.  They realized that keeping lead times short and 
focusing on flexible production lines actually resulted in higher quality, better 
productivity, and better utilization of equipment and space (Liker, 2004).  They were, in 
effect, doing more with less.   
The fundamental tenets of lean production are value, the value stream, flow, pull, 
and perfection.  Value is defined by the customer as the good or service that is being 
produced.  The value stream refers to the series of sequential steps that the value takes 
through a process to reach its finished state when it is ready to be given to the customer.  
Figure 1 shows a value stream map for a company’s steel assembly fabrication process.  
In this example, the value is an individual part made out of steel provided by “Michigan 
Steel Co” (the supplier) for distribution to “State Street Assembly” (the customer). Flow 
refers to the ability of a value to move continuously from step to step in its production 
process without interruption or wasted motion; it is the contrary method to a batch-and-
queue process.  Pull, in its simplest terms, means that an item should not be produced 
until it is requested by its customer.  This is in contrast to a “push” system, which 
attempts to predict customer demand and cover that demand with inventory.  Pull systems 
provide the right amount at the right time; no more, no less, not early, not late.  Finally, 
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perfection is just that – repeating the leaning process until there is complete elimination 
of muda (Womack, 2003).  Incorporating these tenets into a single effort with a focus on 
eliminating wasted time and resources at each step results in a fast, flexible process that 
gives customers what they want when they want it, at the highest quality and affordable 
cost (Liker, 2004).   
 
Figure 1.  Example of a Value Stream Map (Womack, 2003) 
 
Six Sigma 
While Lean focuses on making a process more efficient, Six Sigma is a 
methodology used to improve product quality.  Six Sigma is defined as a comprehensive 
and flexible system for achieving, sustaining and maximizing business success.  Six 
Sigma is uniquely driven by close understanding of customer needs, disciplined use of 
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facts, data, and statistical analysis, and diligent attention to managing, improving, and 
reinventing business processes (Pande, 2000).  Six Sigma was embraced by the Motorola 
Corporation as a method of improving customer satisfaction by increasing product 
quality.  “Sigma (σ)” is a term in statistics that refers to the amount of variation of data 
points from the mean in a data set.  Within the context of a normal distribution, this 
means that 99.99998% of all data points are within six standard deviations (six sigma) 
from the mean (see Figure 2).  In business terms, this can be quantified as operating with 
only 3.4 defects per million opportunities, where a “defect” is defined as any instance or 
event in which the product or process fails to meet a customer requirement.  A company 
that is able to fine-tune its products and processes to this level will be near-perfection in 
meeting customer requirements (Pande, 2000).   
 
 
Figure 2.  "Six Sigma" deviations from the mean (Pande, 2000) 
 
The Six Sigma model used to guide process improvement is called the “DMAIC” 
model, which is a five-step process used to Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and 
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Control product and process defects (Pande, 2000).  Figure 3 depicts the “DMAIC” 
model below:   
 
Figure 3.  "DMAIC" model (Pande, 2000) 
 
The DMAIC model consists of the following five steps: 
• Define the process by identifying the customers, identifying what is important to 
the customers, and identifying existing output conditions. 
 
• Measure the process by using metrics to collect data. 
 
• Analyze the data results to identify the most important causes of the problems. 
 
• Improve the process by developing and implementing solutions. 
 
• Control the process means that once the process is within performance standards, 
it is monitored. 
 
Lean Six Sigma 
Lean Six Sigma, as the name implies, combines Lean and Six Sigma to achieve 
greater process improvement gains.  The purpose of Lean is to minimize waste (increase 
efficiency) and that of Six Sigma is to reduce variation (increase effectiveness).  The 
result of the combination is the customer will receive a defect-free product faster.  In 
general, Lean techniques will result in more immediate gains.  Improvements from Six 
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Sigma application will take longer. Using the methods together will maximize 
productivity and ensure customers are getting what they need, when they need it (George, 
2002). 
Lean and Six Sigma principles can be applied to logistics and supply chain 
operations.  In their book Lean Six Sigma Logistics: Strategic Development to 
Operational Success, Thomas Goldsby and Robert Martichenko developed a useful tool 
they refer to as the “bridge” model (see Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4.  Lean Six Sigma Logistics "Bridge" Model (Goldsby, 2005) 
 
The guiding principles of this model for solving logistics challenges are logistics 
flow, logistics capability, and logistics discipline, which form a “bridge” between a 
company and its customers.  Logistics flow refers to the movement of assets, information, 
and financial data across the bridge.  Logistics capability encompasses predictability, 
stability, and visibility of the company’s processes.  Logistics discipline refers to 
collaboration, systems optimization, and waste elimination (Goldsby, 2005).    
Business Process Reengineering 
Reengineering is defined as the fundamental rethink and radical redesign of 
business processes to generate dramatic improvements in critical performance measures -
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- such as cost, quality, service and speed.  The basic idea is to start with a blank sheet of 
paper, forget about current processes and traditions, take what is known about customers 
and their preferences, and develop completely new “optimized” business processes.  The 
goal is to produce simplified business processes, empowered personnel, and a shift of 
emphasis from individual to team achievements (Hammer, 2003).   
Theory of Constraints 
The Theory of Constraints (TOC), developed by Dr. Eliyahu M. Goldratt, is based 
on the idea that quality and productivity will increase if various constraints are removed. 
The philosophy emphasizes that a single constraint or bottleneck exists in any process 
and controls the output from the entire process.  A constraint is anything that hinders an 
organization in reaching its goals. There are two types of constraints: physical and non-
physical. Some examples of physical constraints are warehouse space, machine capacity, 
or number of delivery vehicles.  Some examples of non-physical constraints are 
employee attitudes, customer demand, or company procedures.  Each type of constraint 
must be identified, categorized, and treated accordingly in order to manage performance.   
TOC can be applied to manufacturing processes, such as inefficient factory 
layouts, wrong quantity or type of inventory, or schedule problems, and to management 
processes, such as outdated policies or procedures (Goldratt, 1992).  TOC uses a six-step 
process to enable ongoing improvement: 
1. Identify the system’s constraints 
2. Decide how to exploit the system’s constraints 
3. Subordinate everything else to the decision in step 2 
4. Elevate the system’s constraints 
5. If the system’s constraints were changed, return to step 1 
6. Change the system if required 
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TOC is not a substitute for other CPI tools; it should be used in conjunction with other 
CPI tools to reap maximum benefits.  Although each of the CPI methodologies has 
different tool sets and different goals, there is a common thread — all involve reducing or 
removing barriers to customer service.  Six Sigma reduces variation, Lean reduces waste, 
and TOC reduces constraints.  Table 1 below, created by the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) for CPI familiarization training, depicts a comparison of each of these 
tools. 
Table 1.  Comparison of Six Sigma, Lean, and Theory of Constraints (DAU, 2006) 
 
Business Case Analysis 
In the context of this paper, a business case is a presentation that captures the 
reasoning for initiating a process improvement project.  It is not a CPI methodology 
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itself.  A business case captures various characteristics of a proposed process 
improvement project, such as the background of the project, expected benefits, expected 
costs, the alternatives considered, the expected risks associated with each alternative, and 
the implementation timeline.  A business case analysis is “a systematic examination of 
alternatives resulting in a recommendation based on the ‘corporate’ good” (AFSO 21 
Playbook, 2007).  The main goal is to help management make an informed decision 
whether a proposed process improvement effort should be undertaken.   
Change Management 
Similarly, change management is not a CPI methodology in itself, but it is a 
necessary function in order to successfully employ any major process improvement 
effort.  Organizational change management refers to the processes and tools used for 
managing the human side of corporate change.  According to Brien Palmer in his book 
Making Change Work: Practical Tools for Overcoming Human Resistance, changes that 
fail usually do not fail because of technical reasons – something inherently flawed about 
the change itself (2003).  They usually fail because of human reasons; i.e., the promoters 
of the change did not attend to the healthy, real, and predictable reactions of normal 
people to disturbances in their routines.  Overcoming these human barriers requires a 
special kind of leader, or a change agent, who has the clout, the conviction, and the 
charisma to make things happen (Womack, 2003).  Effective change management is a 
critical element of any process improvement activity.   
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The Roll-up: Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century 
AFSO21 is an improvement model customized to the unique environment of the 
United States Air Force which leverages improvement methods from various sources, 
such as Lean, Six Sigma, Theory of Constraints and Business Process Reengineering with 
the ultimate objective of improving combat capability (AFSO21 Playbook, 2007).  
AFSO21 uses portions of these methods to increase operational support, kill non-value-
added work, use “clean sheet” thinking, improve how we operate, and identify gaps 
within Air Force operations to maximize value and eliminate waste.  The desired effects 
of these Smart Operations are to increase productivity of Air Force personnel, increase 
critical asset availability, improve response time and decision making agility, sustain safe 
and reliable operations, and improve energy efficiency.   
According to the Director of ACC/A9, AFSO21 is comprised of four components: 
CPI, performance measurement, the 8-step problem solving process, and Strategic 
Alignment and Deployment (SA&D).  The first component, CPI, has already been 
discussed.  The focus of the second component, performance measurement, is to ensure 
that the right types of performance (i.e., results vice activity) are being measured the right 
way (i.e., using effects-based data to track specific progress from a known starting point 
to a new end-state).  This is referred to as a “baseline-to-target” approach.  The third 
component consists of the following eight-step problem-solving approach:   
 
1. Clarify The Problem 
2. Break Down The Problem/Identify Performance Gaps 
3. Set Improvement Target 
4. Determine Root Causes 
5. Develop Countermeasures 
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6. See Countermeasures Through 
7. Confirm Results and Process 
8. Standardize Successful Processes 
 
The first step is critical because the team must understand which problem needs to be 
solved in order to be in the best position to solve it.  The second step involves gathering 
objective data and reviewing appropriate metrics in order to determine the root cause of 
the problem.  The third step entails setting a specific, measurable, attainable goal for the 
desired effect of the process improvement effort.  The purpose of the fourth step is to 
identify and attack the source of the problem, as opposed to performing “quick fixes” on 
the symptoms of the problem.  This will ensure the problem doesn’t occur again in the 
future.  The purpose of step five is to come up with a quality solution that is practical, 
effective, and accepted by the stakeholders affected by its implementation.  The purpose 
of step six is to implement the plan developed in the previous steps.  Step seven entails a 
comparison of the metrics of the new process with the old process to determine if the 
improvement effort was a success.  The purpose of step eight is to ensure the 
implementation of the new process is standardized and that the results of the new process 
stick.   
The final aspect of AFSO21, Strategic Alignment & Deployment (SA&D), refers 
to the DoD methodology for aligning CPI efforts with strategic policy.  SA&D is the 
process of cascading or communicating policy from top to middle management and 
throughout the rest of the organization using a give-and-take process called “catchball”.  
According to DoD Instruction 5010.43, Implementation of DoD-wide CPI/Lean Six 
Sigma, “DoD components must identify organizational mission, priorities, and goals from 
top to bottom within an enterprise” and “leaders shall apply accepted CPI concepts 
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through a disciplined deployment approach that is focused on the alignment of goals and 
priorities throughout the organization”.  The purposes of SA&D are to execute strategy, 
maintain focus on objectives, and measure performance on meeting those objectives 
along the way (DoDI 5010.43, 2009).  Figure 5 shows the strategic policy deployment 
model for CPI in the DoD. 
 
Figure 5.  DoD Strategic Deployment Model (DoD CPI Guidebook, 2008) 
The first step of SA&D is to review the organization’s mission, priorities and 
goals.  The second step is to deploy those objectives down to the lowest level in the chain 
of command.  The third step is to establish metrics for achieving those objectives at each 
level in the chain in order to quantify how well the organization is meeting its objectives 
at all levels.  The fourth step is to establish a performance baseline against those 
objectives using the appropriate metrics.  The fifth step is to examine that baseline and 
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identify improvement opportunities for closing performance gaps.  The sixth step is to do 
a CPI event on the appropriate improvement target area.  The final step is to collect and 
review data after the improvement effort to determine its effects on the organization’s 
mission (2009).  This paper proposes a methodology for implementing steps three 
through five of SA&D at the enterprise level of an organization.   
What AFSO21 Is Not 
AFSO21 is not a substitute for commanders’ responsibilities at all levels.  It is not 
a substitute for improved Air Force corporate management processes.  And it is not 
another fad for process improvement like Total Quality Management (TQM) that is here 
today and gone tomorrow (AFSO21 Playbook, 2007).  With the right type of leadership 
and buy-in from individuals at the middle management and working levels, AFSO21 is a 
systematic methodology that has the potential to help organizational units streamline 
internal processes, better utilize their workforce, and produce higher quality products 
more efficiently.   
Metric Development 
Measurement Basics 
A metric is defined as a standard of measurement (Miriam-Webster), where 
measurement is the objective representation of objects, processes, and phenomenon 
(Finkelstein, 1984).  Measurement captures information about systems through their 
attributes, which can be either directly or indirectly observable (Cropley, 1998).   
All measurement is done within a context (Morse, 2003), which is shaped by a 
purpose, existing knowledge, capabilities, and resources (Brakel, 1984). Within this 
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context, measurement begins by identifying the system of interest and the attributes to be 
used in defining the system.  In the context of business, a metric is a measure used to 
evaluate an organization’s progress toward its goals (Kirkwood, 1997).  Attribute 
selection is important because the validity of a system measurement is influenced by the 
number of attributes used in the measurement.  If the wrong system attributes are chosen, 
the perceived state of a system may be different from the actual state, so this is a key 
consideration of any framework for effectiveness measurement (Potter, 2000).  In 
addition to the type of attributes chosen, the number of attributes selected must be 
considered.  Fewer attributes will simplify the measurement process, but too few can 
result in poor and/or misleading insights about the system (Sink, 1985).  Once the 
appropriate set of attributes is identified, data collection on the system can take place.   
Types of Scales 
The most common scale types are the Nominal, Ordinal, Interval, Ratio, and 
Absolute scales (Sarle, 1995). A nominal scale only contains equivalence meaning. The 
ordinal type has both equivalence and rank order meaning. Interval measures have these 
two meanings as well, but also have meaning in the intervals between the values. Ratio 
measurement further adds meaning in the ratios of values.  Finally, absolute scales 
measure ratios without units (Ford, 1993).  Figure 6 shows the relationships between 
these scales. 
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Figure 6.  Scale Hierarchy of Commonly Used Measures (Ford, 1993) 
 
Measurement scales can be further categorized as either natural or constructed, 
and as direct or proxy.  A natural scale is one that is accepted, understood, and used by 
everyone.  For example, profit in dollars is a natural scale that is used for many business 
decisions.   A constructed scale is one that must be created for a particular type of 
problem because there is none that exists naturally to measure how well an objective that 
is specific to that problem is achieved.  For example, a teacher uses a constructed scale of 
letter grades to measure students’ comprehension of concepts they have been taught.  In 
this case, the letter grades A, B, C, D, and F represent scores which are ≥90, ≥80, ≥70, 
≥60, and <60, respectively.  A direct scale directly measures the degree of attainment of 
an objective, whereas a proxy scale measures an associated objective, i.e. one that acts as 
a substitute (Kirkwood, 1997).  A proxy measure is essentially a model or approximation 
of the system attribute of interest (Potter, 2000).  For example, the number of dollars is a 
direct scale used to measure “profit”, whereas gross national product is a proxy 
(substitute) scale for measuring “the economic well-being of the country”.  These two 
distinctions actually represent the range of scale types that can be used, from the previous 
example of profit, which uses a natural direct scale to measure the amount of money 
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earned, to class grades, by which professors use a constructed proxy scale to measure a 
person’s intelligence (Kirkwood, 1997).  Other examples can be found in Table 2.     
Table 2.  Measure Types (Kirkwood, 1997) 
 Natural Constructed 
Direct 
Commonly understood measures directly 
linked to strategic objective 
 
Example: Profit 
Measures directly linked to the strategic 
objective but developed for a specific purpose 
 
Example: Gymnastics scoring 
Proxy 
In general use measures focused on an 
objective correlated with the strategic 
objective 
 
Example: GNP (economic well being) 
Measures developed for a specific purpose 
focused on an objective correlated to the 
strategic objective 
 
Example: Student grades (intelligence) 
MOEs and MOPs 
Measurement is fundamental to understanding, controlling, and forecasting 
(Wilbur, 1995).  Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance 
(MOPs) provide different insights about a system. A MOE concerns how well a system 
tracks against its purpose (Sproles, 1997).  However, a MOP describes how well a system 
uses resources (Sink, 1985).  In other words, a MOE determines if the right things are 
being done, and a MOP determines if things are being done right (Sproles, 1997).  The 
key distinction between the two is that a MOP measures activity, but it does not indicate a 
system’s progress toward its purpose.   
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
Many terms are often used to describe the result of an observation, such as 
measurement, indicator, or metric.  In the context of business, key performance indicators 
(KPIs) are the few vital statistics that indicate the health of an organization.  They are the 
quantifiable measures of effectiveness, efficiency, and quality which reflect the 
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performance of an organization in achieving predefined strategic goals and objectives.  
KPIs measure effectiveness by determining if the organization has done what they said 
they would do, efficiency by comparing how many resources were actually used to how 
many were planned to be used, and quality by gauging if the planned efforts were done 
well (Sink/Tuttle, 1989).   
There are two types of indicators: lagging and leading.  Lagging indicators, such 
as most financial metrics, measure the output of past activity, i.e., they are collected and 
reported after the fact.  Lagging indicators are useful for tracking trends, but by the time 
the trend is noticed, there may already be problems.  Leading (outcome-based) indicators 
measure key drivers of business value and can be used as future performance drivers for 
an organization (Kaplan/Norton, 1996).  KPIs are the critical drivers for mission success.  
KPIs are metrics, but not all metrics are KPIs.   
Traps of Metrics 
There are literally thousands of metrics to choose from; the difficulty lies in 
identifying the right ones.  It is easy to use metrics that do not measure the aspects that 
pertain to an organization’s specific problem.  Another issue is “paralysis by analysis”.  
When data is not tied to the organization’s KPIs, employees end up spending a lot of time 
collecting and analyzing data that doesn’t impact the bottom line (Kaplan/Norton, 1996).  
A specific instance of this occurs when an organization uses activity (input) metrics 
versus results-focused (output) metrics.  Basically, they end up reporting status on the 
work they’re doing to meet improvement goals, instead of reporting on the organization’s 
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actual progress toward meeting its goals (Potter, 2000).  Creating metrics that have the 
following characteristics will help organizations avoid running into these and other traps.   
Characteristics of Effective Metrics 
The key to successful measurement is ensuring the right measures are being used 
to gauge the system’s purpose (Brown, 1996).  Effective metrics share some of the 
following characteristics:  strategically-linked, timely, objective, complete, obtainable, 
and valid.   
• Strategically-linked – Effectiveness measures should be traceable to the 
organization’s strategic purpose (Kaplan, 1991).  Metrics should be specific and 
targeted to the organization’s KPIs to ensure they only measure the outcomes that 
have value to the customer (Kaplan/Norton, 1996).   
 
• Timely – Measures should be collected and processed in a timeframe that is 
needed to be relevant within the context (Kaplan, 1991). 
 
• Objective – Measures should be easy to understand.  It should be clear when you 
chart your performance over time which direction is "good" and which direction 
is "bad", so that you know when to take action (Finkelstein, 2003).   
 
• Complete – Measures should address all KPIs in enough detail to accurately 
depict the status of the key mission areas of the organization (Kaplan, 1991).  The 
number of measures should be limited in order to avoid information overload.   
 
• Obtainable – Measures should be readily and easily obtainable from available 
sources (Keeney, 1992).   
•  
• Valid – Measures should actually measure what is intended to be measured in 
order to be meaningful (Carton, 2006).   
Displaying Metrics 
Finally, an important, but often underemphasized aspect of system measurement 
is communicating the information.  The goal for an information display should be to 
present the maximum amount of information possible while ensuring unambiguous 
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understanding of the insights it presents (Tufte, 1997).  An increasingly popular method 
of displaying information is through the use of a metrics dashboard (Eckerson, 2006).   
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive method for developing a complete set of 
measures. However, achieving completeness typically requires both critical and creative 
thinking in an iterative process involving negotiation and compromise among those 
interested in and knowledgeable about the system (Sproles, 2002).   
Linear Regression 
According to Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li, “regression analysis is a 
statistical methodology that utilizes the relation between two or more quantitative 
variables so that a response or outcome variable can be predicted from the other, or 
others” (Kutner, et al, 2005).   
Regression is used in a variety of disciplines, from business to behavioral 
sciences, for three major purposes: description, control, and prediction.  When 
considering the concept of a relation between variables, Kutner highlights the importance 
of distinguishing between a functional relation and a statistical relation.  A functional 
relation between two variables is expressed by a mathematical formula.  For example, if 
X1, X2, X3, and X4 denote the independent variables and Y the dependent variable, a 
functional relation is of the form: 
Y = f (X1,X2,X3,X4) 
Given a particular value of each X, the function f indicates the corresponding value of Y.  
Figure 7 shows an example of a functional relation between the predictor variable “Units 
Sold” and the single response variable “Dollar Sales”.   
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Figure 7.  Example of Functional Relation (Kutner, 2005) 
 
A statistical relation, on the other hand, is not perfect like a functional relation, 
because observations for a statistical relation generally do not fall directly on the curve of 
relationship.  Figure 8 below shows an example of a statistical relation between the 
predictor variable “Midyear Evaluation” and the response variable “Year-End 
Evaluation”.  
 
Figure 8.  Example of Statistical Relation (Kutner, 2005) 
 
The coefficient of determination, R2, is a measure that may be interpreted as the 
proportionate reduction of total variation associated with the use of the predictor variable 
X (where 0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1).  Thus, the larger R2 is, the more the total variation of Y is reduced 
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by introducing the predictor variable X (Kutner, 2005).  Basically, R2 indicates how well 
a regression model describes the relation between the observed values of X and Y.   
The correlation coefficient, r, represents the measure of linear association 
between Y and X when both Y and X are random.  It can vary from 0 (which indicates no 
correlation) to ±1 (which indicated perfect correlation). When the correlation coefficient 
is greater than 0, the two variables are said to be positively correlated; i.e., when one is 
large, the other is also large.  When it is less than 0, they are said to be negatively 
correlated; i.e., when one is large, the other is small (Makridakis, 1998).   
Case Study:  Air Combat Command (ACC) 
ACC is the primary force provider of combat airpower to America's warfighting 
commands.  ACC operates fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, battle-management, and 
electronic-combat aircraft to support global implementation of a national security 
strategy.  ACC also provides command, control, communications and intelligence 
systems, and conducts global information operations.  In addition, ACC “organizes, 
trains, equips and maintains combat-ready forces for rapid deployment and employment 
while ensuring strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of peacetime 
air sovereignty and wartime air defense” (www.my.af.mil).   
The Commander of ACC (COMACC) has two roles: one is to organize, train, and 
equip the forces within ACC, and the other is to direct the actions of the Combat Air 
Force (CAF).  The CAF is a collection of Air Force organizations, commands and forces 
tasked to generate specific precise effects from the air, space, and cyberspace.  The 
CAF’s mission is to “Fly, Fight, and Win -- integrating capabilities across air, space, and 
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cyberspace to deliver precise coercive effects in defense of our Nation and its global 
interests” (CAF Strategic Plan 2010).   
The ACC/A9 AFSO21 office manages the CPI program for Headquarters ACC.  
According to the Director of ACC/A9, “Excellence in all we do directs us to develop a 
sustained passion for the continuous improvement and innovation that will propel the Air 
Force into a long-term, upward spiral of accomplishment and performance.”   
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III. Methodology 
This chapter presents a methodology for developing metrics to identify how and 
where to use continuous process improvement (CPI) in an organization.  Each step will 
be described for the general case, followed by an example of a specific application to the 
ACC case study.   
In order for an organization to implement CPI methods effectively, it must have 
the right objective from the outset.  Contrary to popular belief, the ultimate goal of CPI is 
not to simply save money or reduce man-hours (though these are certainly positive side 
effects).  No, for an organization to achieve success it must go much deeper than these 
“symptoms” and examine its sole purpose for existence: it must identify its bottom line.  
In addition to identifying the right objective at the beginning, CPI must be aligned with 
the strategic priorities of the organization’s leadership (Sink/Tuttle, 1989).  In chapter 2, 
how this is done in the DoD via the SA&D process is discussed.   
Arguably, the sole purpose for existence for any company is to make a profit.  
Consider the previous examples of saving money and reducing man-hours.  The reason 
for saving money (i.e., reducing operating costs) is to increase profit.  Likewise, the 
reason for cutting man-hours (i.e., reducing labor costs), is to increase profit.  Therefore, 
for a CPI event to have the most success with lasting results for a company, the target for 
improvement must be the bottom line, which is to increase profit.   
The military, however, does not work for profit, so how do we define our bottom 
line?  According to Sink and Tuttle, improving performance is the bottom line 
(Sink/Tuttle, 1989).  The current mission of the US Air Force is “to fly, fight and win… 
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in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” (Air Force Fact Sheet, 2010).  Our primary shareholders, 
the American public, expect us to perform our mission well in order to protect our nation.  
To that end, the Air Force’s bottom line is our warfighting capability.  It’s just not about 
“doing more with less”.  It’s about doing what we do better.   
As noted previously, ACC’s mission is to provide forces of combat airpower to 
America's warfighting commands.  Therefore, ACC’s bottom line is readiness to provide 
warfighting capability.  According to DoD Directive 7730.65, readiness is defined as “a 
measure of the Department of Defense's ability to provide the capabilities needed to 
execute the missions specified in the National Military Strategy” (2007).  The Combat 
Air Force (CAF) Strategic Plan states that winning the current fight and 
deterring/winning the future fight requires “a credible, ready force”, and the decision 
maker for ACC, the COMACC will “place increased emphasis on readiness” (2010, 
emphasis added).  Therefore, the COMACC values readiness as the critical indicator for 
his organization’s ability to perform its mission.   
Now that the decision maker’s values have been determined, the next step is to 
choose appropriate KPIs that can be used to signify how well the organization is meeting 
its bottom line.  For the ACC case study, the primary KPI, readiness, can be measured 
using ratings from the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), Operational 
Readiness Inspection (ORI) reports, the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), 
and the AEF (Air Expeditionary Force) Unit Type Code (UTC) Status Reporting Tool 
(ART).  AFI 10-201 SORTS states that,  
 
“SORTS is the single automated reporting system within 
the Department of Defense (DoD) functioning as the 
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central registry of all operational units of the US Armed 
Forces and certain foreign organizations. SORTS has a 
threefold purpose: it provides data critical to crisis 
planning, provides for the deliberate or peacetime planning 
process, and is used by the Chief of Staff United States Air 
Force (CSAF) and subordinate commanders in assessing 
their effectiveness in meeting Title 10, “United States 
Code,” responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces 
for combatant commands.  The Air Force uses SORTS 
status information in assessing readiness, analyzing 
readiness trends, and supporting readiness decisions.  
SORTS provides broad bands of information on selected 
unit status indicators which include the commander’s 
assessment of the unit’s ability to execute the mission set 
for which it is organized or designed (AFI 10-201, 2006, 
emphasis added)”.  
 
In addition to SORTS reports, AFPD 10-2 AF Readiness dictates that “the Air 
Force will continually assess readiness based on criteria established by the Secretary of 
Defense, CJCS, Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 
Training, exercise evaluation and inspection assessments are critical and will be used for 
readiness assessments” (AFPD 10-2, 2006).  These assessments are called ORIs, which 
are described in AFI 90-201 Inspector General Activities below:  
“ORIs evaluate and measure the ability of units to perform 
their wartime, contingency, or force sustainment missions.  
Phase I evaluates the unit’s transition from peacetime 
readiness and the unit's ability to maintain and sustain 
essential home station missions during and after the 
deployment of forces and includes the major graded area 
(MGA) of Positioning the Force.  Phase II evaluates the 
unit’s ability to meet wartime/contingency taskings through 
the MGAs of Employing the Force, Sustaining the Force, 
and Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO)”. 
 
AFI 10-244 Reporting Status of AEFs describes the AEF as “the Air Force’s 
methodology for organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining rapidly responsive air 
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and space forces to meet defense strategy requirements.  Through the AEF, the Air Force 
supports defense strategy requirements using a combination of both permanently assigned 
and rotational (allocated) forces” (2008).   
Readiness can also be measured using the DRRS, which is described in AFPD 10-
2 AF Readiness as “an OSD net-centric, web-enabled initiative to manage and report the 
readiness of DOD forces to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS).  All Air Force 
readiness related programs and processes will be aligned with DRRS initiatives” (2006, 
emphasis added).  According to DoD Directive 7730.65 DRRS, this system is used to 
measures and report on the readiness of military forces and the supporting infrastructure 
to meet missions and goals assigned by the Secretary of Defense.  DRRS is “a 
capabilities-based, adaptive, near real-time readiness reporting system for the 
Department of Defense” (2007, emphasis added).  The DRRS User Guide says that 
DRRS “assesses a deployed unit’s ability to perform its mission essential tasks while 
assigned to a Combatant Commander (COCOM).  The Air Force identifies Unit Type 
Code (UTC) elements that can be deployed separately or as part of a capability package 
to support a designated operation” (2010).   
In addition to DRRS, the AEF Reporting Tool (ART) is also used to assess 
deployment readiness, which is introduced in AFPD 10-2 Readiness:  
“the ART allows AEF allocated units the ability to report 
UTC level readiness data.  It allows immediate updates and 
ready access to an aggregate UTC status for all levels of 
command with sufficient depth of information to make 
informed decisions on the employment of Air Force 
capabilities across the full range of military operations.  
Integration of DRRS and ART is critical to provide the 
required visibility of Air Force capabilities and resources 
while supporting the AEF construct.”   
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ART measures the unit’s ability to meet the Combatant Commander’s (COCOM) 
requirements outlined in operational plans.   
Once KPIs have been chosen, the next step is to solicit metrics and success 
criteria from the decision maker to determine how the organization is performing.  Per 
AFI 10-201, SORTS documents and measures four categories that determine the unit’s 
ability (readiness) to perform its mission based on the unit's full wartime requirement for 
which it was organized or designed:  
1. Personnel – This refers to the number of personnel assigned, 
authorized, and available to perform the unit’s mission based 
on Unit Manning Document or UTC requirements.  
This category is denoted by the letter “P” on SORTS reports. 
 
2. Training – This refers to the required training for personnel 
assigned to the unit to perform the mission.   
This category is denoted by the letter “T” on SORTS reports. 
 
3. Equipment/Supplies – This refers to the number and type of 
equipment required to perform the unit’s mission.   
This category is denoted by the letter “S” on SORTS reports. 
 
4. Equipment Condition – This refers to the condition of 
possessed equipment and supplies required to perform the 
unit’s mission.   
This category is denoted by the letter “R” on SORTS reports. 
 
AFI 10-201 states that “category-levels (C-levels) reflect the degree to which unit 
resources meet prescribed levels of personnel, equipment, and training”.  Each of the four 
categories (P, T, S, and R) is assigned a C-level on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 and 4 
represent the best and worst ratings, respectively, and C-levels of 5 and 6 are used to 
indicate that the unit is not required to report at the present time (C-levels of 5 and 6 are 
not used as ratings).  C-levels are defined as follows: 
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C-1. The unit possesses the required resources and is 
trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it 
is organized or designed. The resource and training area 
status will neither limit flexibility and methods for mission 
accomplishment nor increase vulnerability of unit 
personnel and equipment. The unit does not require any 
compensation for any deficiencies. 
 
C-2. The unit possesses the required resources and is 
trained to undertake most of the wartime mission(s) for 
which it is organized or designed. The resource and training 
area status may cause isolated decreases in flexibility in 
methods for mission accomplishment, but will not increase 
the unit's vulnerability under most envisioned operational 
scenarios. The unit would require little, if any, 
compensation for deficiencies. 
 
C-3. The unit possesses the required resources and is 
trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the 
wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. 
The resource and training area status will result in 
significant decrease in flexibility for mission 
accomplishment and will increase vulnerability of the unit 
under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios. 
The unit would require significant compensation for 
deficiencies. 
 
C-4. The unit requires additional resources or training to 
undertake its wartime mission(s), but it may be directed to 
undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with resources 
on hand. 
 
C-5. The unit is undergoing a Service-directed resource 
action and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the 
mission set for which it is organized or designed. 
 
C-6. The unit is not required to measure assets in a 
specified area. C-6 (not a rating) may not be used as an 
Overall C-level. 
 
AFI 10-201 instructs that “unit commanders assign the Overall C-level each time it is 
reported based on unit readiness.  Normally, the lowest level of the four measured 
resource areas is reported as the Overall C-level provided it is a realistic indication of the 
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unit’s readiness (based on the C-level definitions)”.  In other words, the overall SORTS 
C-level for a particular unit is the maximum C-level of its sub-categories.  For example, 
if the C-levels for a particular unit are P-3, T-2, S-2, and R-1, then the unit’s overall 
readiness level is C-3.  ACC is considered “Green” if 70% of its units are C-1 or C-2.   
ORIs measure a wing’s overall readiness “using the five-tier scale Outstanding, 
Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory”, as presented in AFI 90-201.  ACC 
is considered “Green” if 100% of its wings are rated “Satisfactory” or higher.   
The DRRS User Guide states that a unit that has been assigned mission essential 
tasks will use the following rating structure to classify its ability to “accomplish its task 
or mission to prescribed standards and conditions”: 
Yes (Green):  The organization can accomplish its mission 
essential task or mission to prescribed standards and 
conditions. The “Yes” assessment should reflect 
demonstrated performance in training or operations. 
 
Qualified Yes (Yellow):  The organization can accomplish 
most or all of the task to standard under most conditions. 
The mission essential task assessment must clearly define 
the specific standard and conditions that cannot be met, as 
well as the shortfalls or issues impacting the unit's inability 
to accomplish the task. 
 
No (Red):  The organization is unable to accomplish the 
mission essential task or mission to prescribed standards 
and conditions at this time. 
 
Not Assessed (Striped):  The organization has not yet been 
assessed (DRRS User Guide, 2010).  
 
 
When all of the mission essential tasks assigned to a unit have been assessed, that 
information is ready to be used towards assessing the overall mission capabilities.  ACC 
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is considered “Green” if 100% of deployed units report “Yes” or “Qualified Yes” in 
DRRS.   
Per AFI 10-244 Reporting Status of AEFs, the overall assessment of a UTC is 
rated in ART using the following guidelines: 
Green = Go.  All identified personnel, equipment and 
training for the AEF allocated UTC are available for 
deployment within 72 hours of notification or sooner if 
subject to more stringent criteria. 
 
Yellow = Caution.  The UTC has a missing or deficient 
capability; but that missing or deficient capability does not 
prevent the UTC from being tasked and accomplishing its 
mission in a contingency and/or AEF rotation.   
 
Red = No Go.  The UTC has a missing or deficient 
capability that prevents the UTC from being tasked and 
accomplishing its mission in a contingency and/or AEF 
rotation.  
 
ACC is considered “Green” if 100% of UTCs are Green or Yellow.   
Once data has been identified for each KPI, the next step is to retrieve that data 
from all source databases and combine into a single local database.  It will likely be 
necessary to create a new database and adjust the format of the source data in order to 
make a common format for all data.  For the ACC case study, ORI ratings are available 
on the ACC/IG website on the Air Force Portal.  The search was narrowed to include all 
ORIs (Phase I, Phase II, and full inspections) for Active Duty units only from October 
2008 through October 2010 (the time when this study was initiated).  Then the data set 
was reduced by selecting only aviation wings.  This resulted in 12 data points for ORIs 
during the analyzed timeframe.  SORTS scores are available in monthly reports prepared 
by ACC/A3OR.  ACC/A3 had collected this data monthly from the SORTS website on 
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the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and prepared their own 
PowerPoint briefings containing the data.  (Historical data was not available through the 
SORTS website.)  DRRS scores are available through the DRRS website on the SIPRNet.  
Note: DRRS scores were not used because the historical data was incomplete since all 
units were not yet required to report their scores during the analyzed timeframe.  ART 
scores are available through the ART website on the SIPRNet.  Note: ART scores were 
not used because historical data is not maintained on the ART website.  A 
recommendation to maintain this data is included in Chapter 5.   
Since each database has its own unique format, a single data table was created 
using Microsoft Excel to combine the data.  Table 3 depicts this data table with notional 
data.     
Table 3.  Excel Data Table with Notional SORTS Scores 
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Once all of the KPI scores have been collected, they should be examined for any 
interdependencies between them.  The recommended tool for this situation is a linear 
regression model because it can reveal association between two or more variables, as well 
as predict values for a response variable y based on a set of explanatory variables x1 
through xn, where n is the number of indicators chosen for a specific situation 
(Makridakis, 1998).   For example, a company may be interested in predicting future 
sales for a particular product y based on three different indicators: past performance of 
the product (x1), inflation rates (x2), and time of year (x3).  For the ACC case study, the P, 
T, S, and R scores in SORTS (the explanatory variables) were tested for interaction 
between each other, as well as tested for their ability to predict the corresponding unit’s 
ORI rating (the response variable).  These results are outlined in Chapter 4 of this paper.   
In order to create an accurate picture of the state of an organization’s health, it is 
necessary to plot the KPI data for several periods leading up to the current period.  The 
reason for this is to analyze trends to determine where the organization has come from, 
where it is today, and predict which way it’s headed in the near future.  For the ACC case 
study, SORTS scores for individual units should be plotted over the previous six months 
in order to sufficiently determine trends in the data.  The current month’s data for each 
organization will highlight the shortfalls between their required readiness level and its 
actual capability to perform its mission.  This shortfall is also known as a capability gap.   
Once the readiness capability gaps have been identified for each unit within the 
organization, each unit should be prioritized based on the largest capability gaps.  This 
will identify those units that are most in need of continuous process improvement.  At the 
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working level, this simply means sorting the capability gaps in Excel from largest to 
smallest.   
In order to make the previous work worthwhile and actionable, the results must be 
communicated clearly to the decision maker.  The key here is to present the maximum 
amount of information possible while ensuring unambiguous understanding of the 
insights it presents (Tufte, 1997).  This step entails presenting the plots for both the 
current period and the previous periods in order to portray the current state of the 
organization to the decision maker and highlight the units with the largest capability gaps.   
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IV. Analysis & Results 
Assumptions 
The data set examined is comprised of Active Duty Status of Resources and 
Training (SORTS)-reporting units that were part of Air Combat Command (ACC) 
between October 2008 and October 2010.  This includes data for units that belong to the 
8th Air Force, which were previously under ACC but are now under Air Force Global 
Strike Command (AFGSC).  Data for Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve 
Command (AFRC) units were not included in this study.   
Limitations 
SORTS scores are lagging indicators, which means that they measure the output 
of past activity.  As noted in Chapter 2 of this paper, these scores are useful for tracking 
trends, but by the time a negative trend is noticed, there may already be problems.   
Another limitation that surfaced during this study was the fact that ACC reports 
SORTS scores for aviation units and support units separately, on an alternating bi-
monthly basis (i.e., scores for aviation units are reported during odd months, and scores 
for support units are reported during even months).  And since SORTS data are not 
archived on the SORTS website, only half of the complete data set was available for this 
study.   
Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and Air Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) Unit Type Code (UTC) Status Reporting Tool (ART) scores were introduced 
because of their usefulness to assess readiness.  However, the Air Force deploys units, 
entities, etc. on the UTC system, so the deployed units measured by DRRS and ART are 
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not the same as the home units measured by other systems, such as Operational 
Readiness Inspections (ORIs) and SORTS.  Since this would be like “comparing apples 
to oranges”, the DRRS and ART data were not included in this study.  In addition, 
historical ART data is not currently being maintained, so it was also unavailable.   
There were also limitations to performing regression analysis in this study.  ORI 
scores are reported at the wing level only; they are not an aggregate of scores for the 
squadrons that comprise the wing.  Similarly, SORTS scores are only assessed at the 
squadron level; they are not aggregated up to a wing-level score.  Therefore, SORTS and 
ORI scores are not directly comparable, which severely limits the ability to draw 
conclusions about correlation and/or predictability between the different types of scores.  
Several methods were used in attempt to work around this issue, but to no avail.   
Actual SORTS scores for individual units and specific results about trends and 
capability gaps are classified.  These results will be replaced with notional data in order 
to communicate the methodology while preserving the sensitivity of the data.  All other 
results are unclassified.   
Analysis & Results 
Once all of the SORTS and ORI data were collected and combined into one 
database, it was necessary to eliminate incomplete and erroneous SORTS observations 
from the data set.  This included observations from units that no longer belong to ACC, 
observations that did not have a score in one or more of the P, T, S, or R categories, and 
observations where any of the categories were reported as C-6.  Recall from Chapter 3 
that C-6 is not a rating and may not be used as an overall C-level because the unit is not 
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required to measure assets in a specified area (AFI 10-201, 2006).  The remaining data 
set was comprised of over 1,300 usable observations, as depicted in Table 4 below: 
Table 4.  Observation Breakdown 
 
 
Once the data set was purged of “bad” data, the first step was to use multivariate 
analysis to examine the SORTS and ORI scores for interdependencies.  A correlation 
model was used to identify any possible causal relationship between the P, T, S, and R 
variables.  A high correlation between any pair of these variables could identify the 
potential to impact one variable based on a change in another variable.  For example, if P 
and T scores were correlated, this would imply that improving a unit’s personnel 
availability may also affect (and hopefully, improve) that unit’s training status.  This 
hypothesis seems reasonable because people can only be trained if they are available.  
Correlation between the other variables could be used to make similar interpretations.   
As it turned out, there was no apparent correlation between any of the SORTS 
variables.  All correlation coefficients were below 0.25, indicating very low correlation.  
Table 5 below shows the correlation matrix for the SORTS scores.   
 
Total
# ORIs 12
Total Observations 1905
Non-ACC Observations 170
Bad Observations 393
Good ACC Observations 1342
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Table 5.  P-T-S-R Correlation Matrix 
 
The next effort was to examine the ability of SORTS scores to predict ORI 
ratings.  In addition to the specific rating, the categories were broadened to assess the 
model’s ability to predict whether the wing passed or failed each inspection.  
Specifically, a rating of “Outstanding”, “Excellent”, or “Satisfactory” is considered to be 
passing, while a rating of “Marginal” or “Unsatisfactory” is considered a failure.   
However, since SORTS and ORI rankings are reported at different levels 
(squadron and wing, respectively), a workaround was used that involved applying a 
wing’s ORI score onto all of the squadrons in that wing during the month of the ORI.  
For example, if the ORI rating for wing A (which is comprised of squadrons 1, 2, and 3) 
is “Satisfactory” in January 2010, then the rating for squadrons 1, 2, and 3 in January 
2010 is “Satisfactory”.  The purpose for doing this was to have directly comparable data 
(i.e., “apples to apples”), as well as to generate more useable data points for the 
correlation and regression models.  This enabled us to expand the 12 ORIs to 49 
ORI/SORTS observations.  The results for this method applied to the responses of ORI 
rating and pass/fail are shown in Table 6 below:   
 
P T S R
P 1 -0.1751 -0.0654 -0.0282
T -0.1751 1 0.1195 0.0623
S -0.0654 0.1195 1 0.2360
R -0.0282 0.0623 0.2360 1
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Table 6.  Regression:  Using SORTS Scores to Predict ORIs 
 
 
These results show that the R2 values for both models were very low, which 
indicates that neither model was capable of accurately predicting ORI results.  The low p-
values indicate that the source effect of the S and R scores have comparatively more 
impact on the ORI rating than the P and T scores, but the low correlation coefficients 
indicate that there was very little dependence between any of the scores and the ORI 
rating.  The P score seems to have more of an effect on whether the unit passes the ORI, 
but the low R2 value invalidates any assumed predictive power.  (Note: There are no 
correlation coefficients for the Pass/Fail model because the response variable was based 
on a character nominal scale.)   
We also used various averages for the squadron SORTS scores in an attempt to 
reduce variability within the individual scores and capture values that incorporate the 
previous months leading up to the ORI.  These variations include: taking the average 
across the P, T, S, R scores for each inspected wing, the average of each of the P, T, S, R 
scores for all squadrons within each inspected wing during the month of the ORI, and the 
average for all squadrons within each inspected wing over each month from one to six 
months prior to the inspection.  All of these attempts yielded results similar to the first 
iteration presented above (see Table 7 below).   
R2 Source Effect
Correlation 
Coefficient R2 Source Effect
P Score > 0.1 0.1647 0.0390
S Score 0.0333 0.2312 > 0.1
T Score > 0.1 0.0502 > 0.1
R Score 0.0622 -0.0095 > 0.1
0.148549 0.2659
ORI Rating ORI Pass/Fail
ObsPredictor
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Table 7.  Regression:  Using SORTS Averages to Predict ORIs 
 
 
Unfortunately, the inherent problem with this approach was that the four predictor 
variables, which had considerable variance, were used to predict a response variable with 
no variance.  This severely limited the predictive capability of the model.  (A 
recommendation to report ORI rankings and SORTS scores at both the squadron and 
wing levels will be recorded in Chapter 5.)   
Trends and Capability Gaps 
After examining the dependencies within the data, the next step was to plot the 
data in order to analyze trends and identify capability gaps.  In general, a capability gap 
can be measured by comparing the actual scores against a target value which is based on 
the decision maker’s goals for the organization.  For this study, the target SORTS score 
was 2 because ACC’s goal is for units to be C-2 or better.  What ACC would like to do is 
minimize the maximum P, T, S, R score for any unit, which is referred to as a minimax 
problem. (Winston, 2004)  However, by simply reporting that minimax, much 
information is lost.  Since the overall SORTS C-level is the maximum of the P, T, S, R 
Predictor Obs R2 Source Effect
Correlation 
Coefficient R2 Source Effect
Sq Scores - Avg Across 49 < 0.1 0.0371 0.2337 < 0.1 > 0.1
Wg Avg - same month 48 < 0.1 > 0.1 0.0282 < 0.1 > 0.1
1-mo Avg 44 < 0.1 > 0.1 < .0001 < 0.1 > 0.1
2-mo Avg 44 < 0.1 > 0.1 0.0631 < 0.1 > 0.1
3-mo Avg 44 < 0.1 > 0.1 0.1194 < 0.1 > 0.1
4-mo Avg 40 < 0.1 > 0.1 0.1252 < 0.1 > 0.1
5-mo Avg 40 < 0.1 > 0.1 0.1417 < 0.1 > 0.1
6-mo Avg 40 < 0.1 > 0.1 0.1435 < 0.1 > 0.1
ORI Rating ORI Pass/Fail
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scores, a unit’s overall score is not necessarily representative of its actual health because 
not all sub-categories are reflected in the score.  (A recommendation to change the 
method for determining overall SORTS C-levels is recorded in Chapter 5.)  This issue 
was alleviated for this study by taking the average across the scores.  This average doesn't 
have any mathematical meaning because it was taken across categories that measure 
different things, but it can be used as a metric that distinguishes between units that have 
the same overall (max) score.   
Table 8 below illustrates this method.  Suppose Squadron A has P, T, S, R scores 
of 4-1-1-1 and Squadron B has scores of 4-4-4-4.  Both have the same overall SORTS 
score (C-4), but the reader can see that A is actually doing better than B.  Taking the 
average of A’s and B’s scores (1.75 and 4.0, respectively) gives a much better feel for 
how well each unit is actually able to perform its mission.  In addition, the average can be 
used to determine each unit’s capability gap, which shows how close the unit’s average 
score is from being C-2.  In this example, Squadron A’s gap is -0.25 and B’s gap is 
2.0.  (The negative gap indicates that a unit is actually performing better than the target.)   
Table 8.  Determining a Unit's Overall Health 
 
To apply continuous process improvement effectively, the decision maker should 
apply his resources using a systematic approach.  He should prioritize the organizational 
units for improvement efforts according to the size of their capability gaps.  A key aspect 
that enables this prioritization to work is the fact that the average scores for the lowest-
Sq P-T-S-R
C-level
(Max) Avg Target
Capability Gap
(Avg minus Target)
A 4-1-1-1 4 1.75 2 -0.25
B 4-4-4-4 4 4 2 2
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level units can easily be aggregated to give the decision maker insight about his 
organization at all levels.  In other words, the average score for any level in the hierarchy 
is the average of all lowest-level units under that level.  For example, for ACC, the Major 
Command (MAJCOM), Numbered Air Force (NAF), and Wing averages are simply the 
averages of all squadrons contained within each of those organizations.  Figure 9 shows 
this relationship hierarchically.  In this case, the NAF 1 Average is the average of Wings 
1-4, the NAF 2 Average is the average of Wings 5-7, and the NAF 3 Average is the 
average of Wings 8-11.  Similarly, the MAJCOM Average is the average of Wings 1-11.  
All wing averages are the average of all squadrons contained in them (not depicted).  
 
Figure 9.  Aggregation of Squadron SORTS Scores 
 
Since ACC’s actual SORTS scores and the specific results of this study are 
classified, the following scenario will be used to communicate how this method of 
prioritization was used.   
Suppose that on January 10, 2010, a NAF commander wanted to identify and 
improve the worst performing squadron in his organization.  The NAF structure is 
presented below in Figure 10.   
MAJCOM Avg
NAF 1 Avg NAF 2 Avg NAF 3 Avg
Wing 1 Avg Wing 5 Avg Wing 8 Avg
Wing 2 Avg Wing 6 Avg Wing 9 Avg
Wing 3 Avg Wing 7 Avg Wing 10 Avg
Wing 4 Avg Wing 11 Avg
 47 
 
Figure 10.  Notional NAF Structure 
 
The first thing his team did was to plot the average squadron SORTS scores based 
on available data for Wings 1 and 2 from February 2009 through December 2009 (see 
Figures 11 and 12 below).   
 
Figure 11.  Plot of Notional SORTS Scores for Wing 1 
 
 
NAF
Wing 1
Sq 1 Sq 2
Wing 2
Sq 3 Sq 4
0
1
2
3
4
Wing 1 (Feb-Dec 09)
 Target
Wing Avg
0
1
2
3
4
Wing 2 (Mar-Nov 09)
 Target
Wing Avg
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Figure 12.  Plot of Notional SORTS Scores for Wing 2 
 
The commander’s team ascertained that Wing 1, with the exception of a late spike 
in November, was operating at a fairly steady level in line with the performance target.  
Wing 2, however, was getting considerably worse after performing nominally through 
September.  Therefore, the team decided to dig deeper into Wing 2 by examining the 
performance of its sub-organizations, Squadrons 3 and 4.  Figures 13 and 14 below are 
plots of the notional SORTS data for Squadrons 3 and 4, respectively.   
  
Figure 13.  Plot of Notional SORTS Scores for Squadron 3 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
Unit 1 (Feb-Dec 09)
Target
Sq Avg
C-level
Capability Gap
(1.25)
Squadron 3 (Feb-Dec 0
0
1
2
3
4
Unit 2 (Feb-Dec 09)
Target
Sq Avg
C-level
Capability Gap
(-0.25)
Squadron 4 (Feb-Dec 09)
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Figure 14.  Plot of Notional SORTS Scores for Squadron 4 
 
 
The commander’s team realized they had more visibility into the overall health of the 
squadrons by looking at the average SORTS scores in addition to the C-level.  For 
Squadron 3, the C-level remained constant at 4 throughout the entire time period, but the 
average revealed the fluctuation throughout the time period.  For Squadron 4, the trend 
for the C-level actually mirrored that of the squadron average (both started getting worse 
between June and August), but it still did not adequately capture Squadron 4’s overall 
health.  In this case, the squadron average was always below the target value C-2, which 
revealed that the overall health of Squadron 3 was worse than that of Squadron 4.  
Therefore, the commander’s team recommended doing a CPI event on Squadron 3 before 
working on Squadron 4.  The commander, who saw the logic in the approach, approved 
the team’s recommendation.   
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V.  Recommendations & Conclusion 
Summary 
In chapters 1 and 2 of this paper, the reader was introduced to the concepts of 
continuous process improvement, metric development, and regression analysis.  In 
chapter 3, these concepts were fused to produce a methodology for improving the bottom 
line of an organization by improving its weakest performance areas.  The usefulness of 
this methodology was demonstrated through practical application to ACC in chapter 4.   
Recommendations for Future Study 
The key performance indicators analyzed in this paper are not all-inclusive.  For 
the ACC case study, which can be applied to any MAJCOM in the Air Force, scores from 
other readiness reporting systems can serve as potential readiness indicators.  The idea of 
using DRRS and ART scores was introduced in Chapter 3.  Another set of metrics worthy 
of examination are Unit Compliance Inspection (UCI) scores.  UCIs are conducted to 
assess mission areas that are critical to the health and performance of an organization, 
and a unit’s failure to comply with these areas could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or 
mission impact.  Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that a non-compliant unit is not 
ready to perform its mission, and hence UCI scores could be used to assess readiness.   
Since SORTS scores are fairly subjective, it may be worthwhile to compare 
SORTS P ratings for individual squadrons versus the manning levels for the same 
squadrons during those months.  This would provide insight into the fidelity of the 
SORTS scale by checking the consistency with which the ratings are currently being 
applied.   
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Finally, it may be beneficial to perform the regression and trends analysis on 
aviation and support units separately.  Since a fighter squadron has a very different 
mission from a medical squadron, for example, each unit would likely use different 
definitions for mission impact and would assess their readiness accordingly.  This would 
likely result in a disparity between their respective scores, which would essentially 
appear as though they are using two completely different scales.  Studying the two types 
of units separately may potentially improve the fidelity of both models.   
Other Recommendations 
The following recommendations are intended to overcome some of the limitations 
that were mentioned in Chapter 4 of this paper.  First, the fact that ACC reports SORTS 
scores for aviation and support units on an alternating bi-monthly basis, coupled with the 
issue that SORTS data are not archived on the SORTS website, imposed a limitation on 
the amount of data that was available for this study.  Therefore, it is recommended that all 
SORTS and ART data be archived on its website for easy retrieval.  In the meantime, it 
would be helpful if ACC would report all SORTS scores every month until the website is 
updated.  In addition, functionality should be added that allows a user to produce 
customized reports.   
There were also limitations to performing regression analysis in this study.  Since 
ORI scores are only reported at the wing level and SORTS scores are only assessed at the 
squadron level, these scores were not directly comparable.  One possible option for 
overcoming this limitation would be to aggregate squadron SORTS data into an overall 
wing score.  This would allow both SORTS and ORI scores to be compared at the wing 
level.  Another option would be to assess ORIs at the squadron level, which would also 
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allow for direct comparison of both scores.  Having this data readily accessible on the 
respective websites would also be beneficial.   
Another limitation encountered during this research was the current method for 
determining overall SORTS scores.  Currently, a unit’s overall SORTS C-level is the 
maximum of its P, T, S, R scores.  As we saw in Chapter 4, however, the maximum score 
is not necessarily representative of a unit’s overall health.  Therefore, it is recommended 
that the method for determining overall SORTS C-levels should become something 
besides the maximum of the P, T, S, R scores.  The workaround used in this study 
involved taking the average across the four scores, but this is certainly not the only 
option.   
The AFSO21 tool kit is powerful, flexible, and extremely useful.  It is critical that 
it should be used today in a way that will help the Air Force do its mission better 
tomorrow.   
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Appendix A:  Abbreviations 
 
 
ACC – Air Combat Command 
ACC/A3 – Air Combat Command Directorate of Operations 
ACC/A9 – Air Combat Command Directorate of Analyses, Lessons Learned & AFSO21 
AEF - Air Expeditionary Force 
AFI – Air Force Instruction 
AFPD – Air Force Program Directive 
AFSO21 – Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century 
ART - AEF (Air Expeditionary Force) Unit Type Code (UTC) Status Reporting Tool  
BPR – Business Process Reengineering 
C - Category 
CAF – Combat Air Force 
CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
COCOM – Combatant Commander 
COMACC – Commander of Air Combat Command 
CPI – Continuous Process Improvement 
CSAF - Chief of Staff United States Air Force 
DMAIC – Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DRRS – Defense Readiness Reporting System 
IG – Inspector General 
KPI – Key Performance Indicator 
LSS – Lean Six Sigma 
MOE – Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP – Measure of Performance 
NMS – National Military Strategy 
ORI – Operational Readiness Inspection 
OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense 
P - Personnel 
R - Equipment Condition 
S - Supplies/Equipment 
SA&D – Strategic Alignment and Deployment 
SIPRNet – Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SORTS – Status of Resources and Training Reporting System 
T - Training 
TOC – Theory of Constraints 
TQM – Total Quality Management 
UMD – Unit Manning Document 
UTC – Unit Type Code  
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Appendix B:  Blue Dart 
 
 
AFSO21:  How do we make it work? 
 
Capt Mark Degenhardt 
Dept. of Operational Sciences 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) is not currently being 
used as effectively as it could be across the Air Force.  Thanks to the Air Force website, 
Air Force Times, and other media sources, we hear about various success stories where 
processes are streamlined, hundreds of man-hours are cut, and thousands of American tax 
dollars are saved.  These are obviously very good things, but we need to ask ourselves 
what effect these scattered (and somewhat random) improvements have on the core 
mission?  For example, did streamlining an F-16 tire manufacturing process to double the 
output capacity from four to eight tires per day really benefit the Air Force?  Did it enable 
us to put more planes on the runway and into the fight?  How was this particular process 
chosen?  What was the reason for doing the event?  Was there a reason?  Or was the unit 
directed to “do an AFSO21 event on something” just to meet a quota?   
All of these queries lead to one underlying question: how do we use AFSO21 to 
go from creating OPR fodder to truly making a difference for the Air Force?  This can be 
compared to a medical patient with a minor but lingering illness asking a doctor how to 
get better.  The doctor would probably tell the patient that they need to stop trying to treat 
the symptoms and start treating the root causes of their problem.   For the Air Force, this 
means that, instead of trying to simply save money here or cut man-hours there, AFSO21 
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tools should be aimed at solving the bigger issue of improving the Air Force’s bottom 
line.  For a business, the bottom line is profit.  Therefore, to improve their bottom line is 
to increase profit.  However, since the Air Force is a non-profit government entity, it can 
be argued that our bottom line is mission performance.  In other words, we need to use 
these tools to “fly, fight and win” better.  As it turns out, the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) has done some research that addresses this very issue.   
Through its research, AFIT developed a methodology to identify specific target 
areas where continuous process improvement, i.e., AFSO21, should be applied to 
improve the bottom line of an organization.  The first step in this process is to engage the 
decision maker to solicit the key performance indicators (KPIs) that best reflect the 
organization’s mission.  The goal for this step is to make a list of the answers to the “why 
are we here” question.  The second step is to use and/or develop appropriate metrics 
based on those KPIs to measure how well the organization is doing its mission today.  
The third step is to capture the trends of those KPIs over time to see if the organization is 
getting better or worse.  The fourth and final step is to identify the largest performance 
capability gaps in order to determine where AFSO21 resources should be applied to get 
“the most bang for the buck”.  The result of this process should give the decision maker a 
clear snapshot of his/her organization’s current ability to perform its mission.  This, in 
turn, gives him/her the ability to improve the bottom line by improving the weakest areas.   
The AFSO21 tool kit is powerful, flexible, and extremely useful.  We should be 
using it today in a way that will make the Air Force do its mission better tomorrow.  
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Appendix C:  Storyboard 
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